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CONFLICT, POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH  
 
IN  DUAL-POPULATION LANDS 
 
I. Introduction 
The population of many lands is divided by factors such as origin, culture, religion 
and race into two major groups: Hindus and Muslims in the Indian sub continent, Hutus 
and Tutsis in Rwanda, Greeks and Turks in Cyprus, Maronites and Muslims in Lebanon, 
Jews and Palestinians in Israel-Palestine, Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, 
Muslims and Orthodox Serbs in Bosnia Herzegovina, Pushtuns and Tadzhiks in 
Afghanistan, Sinhalese and Tamils in Sri Lanka, Indians and Melanesians in Fiji, and 
Blacks and Whites in South Africa, to mention a few. Conflicts between the two groups 
inhabiting these lands seem to be imminent and constitute a major aspect of their 
coexistence.  
The recent economic literature on conflicts deals with three major issues: the 
foundations of conflicts, external conflicts and internal conflicts. The literature on the 
foundations of conflicts views conflicts as emerging from a state of nature where property 
rights are not well defined. In the absence of complete assignment of enforceable property 
rights no agent can be prevented from coercing another agent, and seizing and defending 
resources. Hirschleifer (1995) calls this state anarchy and shows that its spontaneous order 
is fragile and is sustainable only when there are strongly diminishing returns to fighting 
effort and incomes exceed the viability minimum. Cooperation is a possible outcome even 
when property rights do not exist. Skaperdas (1992) shows that there is a possibility of 
cooperation when win probabilities are significantly different only for large arms 
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differentials and when their marginal contributions to useful production are similar. 
Grossman and Kim (1995) analyze a general equilibrium model of resource allocation to 
appropriation and productive activities. They focus attention on a non-aggressive 
equilibrium in which no resources are allocated to offensive weapons, defined as predatory 
instruments, and claims to property are fully secure. 
The literature on external conflicts stresses political and economic factors that may 
influence wars. For instance, Grafinkel (1994) studies the interactions between domestic 
politics and international conflicts and shows that political party competition associated 
with electoral uncertainty leads to a decline in military spending. She argues that 
democratic institutions can be thought of as a possible “pre-commitment” mechanism that 
reduces the severity of conflict between nations. Hess and Orphaniedes (2001), however, 
dispute the idea that democracy and democratic institutions reduce conflict and war 
frequency among nations. Bearce and Fisher (2002) argue that given geographical 
parameters, there is an inverse relationship between trade and war. (See also Dorussen, 
2002.) Nafziger and Auvinen (2002) show how other economic factors such as income 
inequality and pervasive rent-seeking by a ruling elite are linked to war and state violence. 
Hess and Orphanides (1995) stress the role of recessions as triggering foreign conflict. 
Blomberg and Hess (2002) argue that a recession combined with external conflict 
increases the probability of internal conflict. 
 In the context of internal conflicts, which is the focus of our paper, the utmost 
interest is given by the literature to civil wars. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) argue that civil 
wars happen if rebels’ perceptions of benefits outweigh the costs of rebellion. Civil wars 
are motivated either by “greed” for private gains or by “grievance” stemming from the 
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degree of autocracy of the regime and ethnic and religious differences. (Cf., Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2000). Evidence provided by Collier and Hoeffler (2002) show that civil wars in 
Africa are mainly due to poor economic performance. In addition to political-economic 
factors, the roles of ideology, ethnicity and religion in civil wars are emphasized. Elbadawi 
and Sambanis (2002) find that democracy is negatively associated with civil violence and 
that civil-war prevalence is positively associated with ethnic fractionalization. Gershenson 
and Grossman (2000) argued that for civil conflict to be never ending the ratio values 
attached to political dominance can be neither too large nor too small. Reynal-Querol 
(2002) concludes that religious differences are a social cleavage more important than 
linguistic differences in the development of a civil war and that democracy significantly 
reduces the incidence of ethnic civil war. Agadjanian and Prata (2002) discuss the effects 
of civil wars on population. Murdoch and Sandler (2002) examine the effect of civil wars 
on growth and on human and physical capital. 
 
Civil war is one possible outcome of internal conflicts in dual-population countries. 
Partition of the land between the rival groups and, alternatively, a formation of a 
federation are possible outcomes representing two polar approaches for settling conflicts 
peacefully. Each of these three possible outcomes of conflicts evolves from a combination 
of socioeconomic characteristics of the rival groups. Table 1 below focuses on a few, 
major, characteristics: human and material capital disparities, cultural and spiritual 
differences and degree of group cohesion. For exposition purpose, these characteristics 
are aggregated into two composite ones. The entries of the table indicate the likely 
political equilibrium in dual-population lands for various levels of differences between the 
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two rival groups with regard to these composite characteristics. The rationale underlying 
these political equilibrium outcomes is based on the premises that: 
i. when the cultural differences are large (small) and the degree of cohesion of each 
of the groups is high (low) the costs of tolerating a peaceful coexistence are high (low) for 
each group; and 
ii. when the human and material capital disparities are large the costs of civil war 
for the richer (poorer) group are low (high), whereas when both groups are equally 
endowed with material wealth and population, the costs of civil war for each group are 
high. 
Table 1. Possible equilibria for various combinations of socioeconomic differences 
between the two inhabiting groups 
         1. Small 
cultural&spiritual 
differences 
and low group 
cohesion 
2. Medium  
cultural&spiritual 
differences 
and medium group 
cohesion 
3. Large  
cultural&spiritual 
differences 
and high group 
cohesion 
 
1. Small  
human and material 
capital disparities 
 
Integration 
or 
Federation 
(stable) 
 
 
 Federation  
(unstable) 
or 
Partition 
 
 
Partition 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
2. Medium  
 human and 
material capital 
disparities 
 
 
Federation 
(stable/unstable) 
 
 
Partition 
or 
Civil War 
 
Partition 
or 
Civil War 
 
3. Large  
human and material 
capital disparities 
 
 
 
 
Federation  
(unstable) 
 
  
Federation 
(unstable) 
 
 
 
Civil War 
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The term civil war is used in Table 1 and the paper as a generic title representing 
any coercive interaction between the two groups, including a large scale war (a likely 
event in case 2-3 and to a lesser extent in case 2-2), guerrilla warfare, ethnic cleansing, 
and submission of one group to its rival (likely outcomes in case 3-3). Similarly, a 
federation can be stable or unstable. When the cultural and spiritual differences between 
the groups are small and the degree of cohesion of each group is low and the level of 
human and material disparity between the groups is low, the probability of a stable 
federation, or even integration, is high (case 1-1). When the groups are considerably 
cohesive and the cultural and spiritual differences between them are substantial, or when 
the human and material capital disparities between the groups are large, a federation is 
likely to be unstable (cases 1-2, 3-1 and 3-2). Partition is likely to be a stable equilibrium 
when the cultural and spiritual differences between the groups are large and each group is 
highly cohesive (cases 1-3 and 2-3). 
There may also be external factors affecting the interaction between the two rival 
groups and, subsequently, their political equilibrium. Although our analysis is focused on 
internal factors, the effect of external factors is indirectly incorporated through the groups’ 
perceptions and consideration of their differences. On the one hand, external factors such 
as close relationship with the motherlands might polarize a local population by 
strengthening ethnic identity.1 On the other hand, external factors such as a threat of 
invading peoples may moderate groups’ perception of the magnitude and importance of 
their socioeconomic differences and increase their degrees of mutual tolerance and 
                                                        
1 As in the case of Greeks and Turks in contemporary Cyprus. 
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solidarity.2 Facing a common enemy, rival groups may form a federation and encourage 
integration. Left alone, they might prefer partition, or fight one another.  
The purpose of this paper is to extend the economic growth theory to the case of 
dual-population lands in the aforementioned political situations: partition, federation and 
civil war. The analysis concentrates on the role of two important demographic and 
economic factors such as population growth rate and wealth disparities and compare the 
optimal consumption growth rates across the possible political outcomes. This comparison 
identifies the conditions that may generate political instability and transition from one 
political state of affair to another under the assumption that the members of each group 
are lifetime-utility maximizers. 
Our presentation of the possible political situations in dual-population lands and 
their implications for growth starts in section II with a partition scenario because the 
analysis of this case can serve as benchmark for the analytically more complicated cases of 
federation and civil war. Section III analyzes the federation outcome and its implication 
for growth and convergence when the federation is strictly political and, alternatively, 
when the federation provides economic benefits through technological exchange and also 
when the federation facilitates a flow of capital and labor between the two groups. Section 
IV analyzes the civil-war outcome and its implication for growth and convergence with a 
distinction between casualty-intensive (bloody) warfare and capital-destruction-intensive 
(sabotage) warfare. Section V concludes. 
 
                                                        
2 As in the cases of the Athenians and Spartans in ancient Greece, the tribes of Israel and, 
subsequently, the kingdoms of Judah and Israel in the biblical period. 
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II. Partition 
Our presentation of this case is based on the following assumptions.  
Assumption 1 (demographics): The land is inhabited by two groups (i = 1 2, ). The groups 
are highly cohesive (i.e., the number of intermarriages is negligible) and the size of each 
group is given by an exponential growth function 
P t P ei i
ni t( ) = 0        (1) 
where Pi
0  and ni  are the initial size and the population growth rate of the i-th group, 
respectively.  
Assumption 2 (intolerance and deterrence): There are considerable cultural and spiritual 
differences between the groups, and at least one of the groups prefers a split to 
coexistence under a single political-economic system. None of the groups is relatively very 
poor in human and material capital and can be easily subjected by the other.  
Assumption 3 (utility): The groups are homogenous with regard to preferences. The 
instantaneous utility from consumption ( c ) of a member of group i is given by u c ti i( ( )) , 
with ui '> 0  and ui "< 0 . For tractability, the explicit form  
u ci i i= β , 0 1< <βi ,        (2) 
is considered. The member’s lifetime utility is additively separable in the instantaneous 
utilities and displays a non-negative invariant rate of time preference ρi . 
Assumption 4 (production and income): The groups are homogenous with regard to 
production. Under separation, the aggregate output of each group is given by a Cobb-
Douglas production function homogenous of degree 1 in labor and capital and satisfying 
Inada’s conditions. Consequently, the income of a member of each group is a concave 
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function of the capital-labor ratio in the respective group, i.e., f k ti i( ( ))  with fi '> 0  and 
fi "< 0 . 
Assumption 5 (capital accumulation): Capital is linearly depreciated, which, in 
conjunction with assumptions 1 and 4, implies that, under separation, the instantaneous 
change in the capital of member of each group i = 1 2,  is given by 
)()()())(()( tkntctkftk iiiiiii +−−=
•
δ       (3) 
where δi  is the capital depreciation rate in group i . 
In view of assumptions 1 and 2, the costs of civil war are high, but also the costs 
of tolerating coexistence in a federation are high. Hence, the political Nash equilibrium is 
division of the land into two sovereign states or autonomous parts.3 Under partition, each 
group’s optimal (lifetime-utility maximizing) consumption change follows the well known, 
Ramsey-type, no-arbitrage rule: 
 
i
iiiii
i
i ntkf
tc
tc
c
β
δρ
−
++−
=≡
•
1
)())(('
)(
)(ˆ     (4) 
 
which states that the instantaneous rate of change in the optimal consumption for each 
group is equal to the difference between the marginal product and user cost of capital, 
deflated by the degree of concavity (one minus the elasticity) of the instantaneous utility 
function of the members.  
                                                        
3 Notable examples are the partitions of the Indian sub-continent in 1947/8, Palestine in 
1947/8, and Cyprus in the early 1970s.  
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III. Federation 
Three types of federations are considered. The first is a strictly political federation. 
The second allows a limited economic cooperation - technological transfer between the 
two groups comprising the federation. The third also allows flow of capital and labor and 
intermarriages, which may transform the dual-population society into an integrated one. 
III.1 Federation without Economic Cooperation 
Assumption 6 (strictly political federation): The two groups are united into a political 
federation. However, each group retains its own identity and economic interests: there is 
no (significant) mobility of population and capital and there is no (significant) transfer of 
technology.  
Assumption 7 (continuation and dissolution): There is no upper-bound on the federation 
life expectancy. However, the federation might be dissolved at every instance t with some 
probability φ( )t , whose cumulative distribution function is F t( ) . The probability of 
continuation (survival) of the federation beyond t (i.e., Φ( ) ( )t F t= −1 ) diminishes with 
the wealth disparity between the two groups as displayed by 
Φ( ) [ ( ) ( )]t e k t k t= − −µ 1 2
2
    (5) 
where µ  is a positive scalar indicating the sensitivity of the federation’s existence to 
wealth disparity between the groups. The underlying rationale is that wealth differential 
intensifies relative deprivation, social tension and, subsequently, political instability – the  
larger the groups’ wealth differential the greater the discontent of the poorer one with the 
federal system. 
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Assumption 8 (federal social welfare): The instantaneous federal social welfare (FSW) 
level is given by the sum of the instantaneous utilities of the individuals affiliated to the 
federation. Recalling assumptions 4 and 5 that the members of each group are identical, 
 
FSW t P t u c t P t u c t( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))= +1 1 1 2 2 2 .   (6) 
 
Assumption 9 (imaginary crossbreed): The representative agent of the federation is an 
imaginary crossbreed of the two groups. His instantaneous well being, u t( ) , reflects an 
equal share in the federation’s instantaneous social welfare level and hence is found by 
dividing the instantaneous federal social welfare by the federation’s population 
 
u t
FSW t
P t P t
( )
( )
( ) ( )
=
+1 2
.     (7) 
  
By substituting Eq. (6) into Eq. (7), the instantaneous well being of the federal 
representative, imaginary crossbreed is equal to the weighted average of the groups’ 
representatives’ instantaneous utilities   
u t
P t
P t P t
u c t
P t
P t P t
u c t( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ( ))
( )
( ) ( )
( ( ))=
+





 +
+





1
1 2
1 1
2
1 2
2 2 . (8) 
 
Assumption 10 (expected lifetime utility): The federal representative imaginary crossbreed 
is aware of the fragility of the federation and the possibility of its dissolution. He has 
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constant, non-negative, rate of time preference ( ρ ≥ 0). He chooses the consumption 
trajectories of his composite personality so as to maximize his expected-lifetime utility   
J t e u d dt
t
= ∫∫ −
∞
φ τ τρτ( ) ( )
00
.    (9) 
 
To solve the federal representative imaginary crossbreed’s problem note that, as 
explained in Appendix A, J t e u d dt e u t t dt
t
t= ∫ ∫ = ∫
∞
− −
∞
φ τ τρτ ρ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 0 0
Φ , recall 
assumption 5 and express the consumption of each group as  
     )()()())(()( tktkntkftc iiiiiii
•
−+−= δ .       (10) 
By substituting this expression (Eq. (10)) into the imaginary crossbreed’s instantaneous 
utility function and applying Euler equation, the optimal consumption growth rate of each 
group i  affiliated to the federation is given, as explained in a greater detail in Appendix B, 
by the following no-arbitrage rule 
i
iji
i
i
jij
i
iiii
i
i
F
tctktk
tpnnntkf
tc
tc
c
β
β
µ
ββ
δρ
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
++−
=≡
•
1
)()]()([
2
1
)()(
1
)())(('
)(
)(
ˆ  (11) 
where j denotes the counterpart group whose population share in the federation is 
p t P t P t P tj j( ) ( ) / [ ( ) ( )]= +1 2 .       (12) 
For each of the groups, the first term on the right-hand side of this strictly political 
federation’s no-arbitrage rule is identical to the no-arbitrage rule in partition, but with the 
groups’ average rate of time preference replacing that of the individual group.  
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The second term on the right-hand side of Eq. (11) indicates that the effect of the 
j-th group’s share in the federation’s population on the optimal rate of change of 
consumption of the i-th group is negative (positive), and hence providing an incentive for 
the i-th group to withdraw from (remain in) the federation, if the j-th group’s rate of 
population growth is larger (smaller) than that of the i-th group. When the populations of 
both groups grow at the same rate, the effect of the j-th population share on the i-th 
group’s consumption growth rate is nil.  
The third term on the right-hand side of Eq. (11) reveals that the wealth disparity 
between the members of group i and the members of group j adversely affects the 
federation’s stability and prospect of survival and moderates the optimal consumption 
growth rate of the i-th group members.  
Thus, starting from the same initial capital-labor ratio and with a rate of time 
preference not considerably larger than that of the imaginary crossbreed, the optimal rate 
of change in the consumption of group i members in a strictly political federation ( Fĉ ) is 
lower than their optimal consumption growth rate under sole sovereignty ( ĉ ) in the case 
of partition if their population growth rate is lower than that of their j-th group 
counterparts and if they are wealthier than their j-th group counterparts. In sum, group i 
prefers to secede from a political federation characterized by no economic cooperation if 
its rate of time preference is not considerably larger than that of the imaginary crossbreed 
so that: 
{( )n nj i>  and ( ( ) ( )} {$ $}k t k t c ci j F> ⇒ < .  (13) 
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III.2 Federation with Partial Economic Cooperation 
Let us now relax a part of assumption 6 and allow exchange of technology 
between the two groups comprising the federation. Movement of labor and capital remains 
prohibited. 
Assumption 11 (cost-free and perfect technological transfer): Capital does not become 
obsolete by technological transfer and adjustment costs are negligible. The two groups 
perfectly and immediately exchange technological knowledge. 
This assumption and (the earlier assumed) rational behavior imply that the two groups use 
the same hybrid technology, f , since f k t f k ti i i( ( )) ( ( ))≥  for each group i = 1 2,  at 
every instance. 
In this case of partial economic cooperation, the optimal consumption growth rate 
of each group i  affiliated to the federation is given by the following no-arbitrage rule 
 
i
iji
i
i
jij
i
iii
i
i
C
tctktk
tpnnntkf
tc
tc
c
β
β
µ
ββ
δρ
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
++−
=≡
•
1
)()]()([
2
1
)()(
1
)())(('
)(
)(
ˆ . (14) 
 
In contrast to the strictly political federation case, the members of group i may 
economically benefit from joining the federation, even when they are wealthier and 
multiply in a lower rate than their counterparts, if they significantly gain from 
technological transfer; namely, if  
)()]()([
2
)()()())(('))((' tctktktpnntkftkf iji
i
jijiiii −+−>−+− β
µ
ρρ  
then Fc ccc ˆˆˆ >>  for any ki and t . 
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III.3 Federation with Broad Economic Cooperation and Integration 
The case of a broader economic cooperation and integration requires a further 
relaxation of assumption 6 to allow capital and labor flows and a relaxation of assumption 
1 to allow intermarriages. Significant, continuous flow of capital and labor and 
intermarriages can be interpreted as a process of integration of the two groups. As 
indicated by Table 1, integration may take place when the cultural, spiritual and human 
and material wealth differences between the groups are small and when each group is not 
highly cohesive (in which case, µ → 0 ). When integration starts the crossbreed is no 
longer imaginary. When integration is completed, the crossbreed is dominant. The optimal 
consumption growth rate of the society of crossbreeds is given by the Ramsey-type no 
arbitrage rule -- the first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (14) but with time-preference 
rate, population-growth rate, depreciation rate and technology characterizing the society 
of crossbreeds. 
 
IV. Civil-War 
In civil war, each group makes offenses against the other. Group i takes into 
account that its own effort in carrying hostile activities ( hi ) increases its satisfaction, but 
adversely affects its capital accumulation due to divergence of resources from production 
to warfare activity. In the same vein, the effort of the antagonist group ( h j ) inflicts 
casualties on group i (i.e., reduces the population growth of group i), and damages its 
current capital stock (i.e., accelerates the depreciation rate of the capital stock of group i). 
These aspects of civil-war are more formally presented by the following assumptions.  
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Assumption 12 (war-time utility): In addition to, and separately from, satisfaction from 
consumption, each group generates instantaneous utility from carrying hostile activities 
against its adversary. That is,  
 
u t u c t h ti i i i( ) ( ( ), ( ))=     (15) 
  
where 
∂
∂
u
c
i
i
> 0 , 
∂
∂
2
2 0
u
c
i
i
< , 
∂
∂
u
h
i
i
> 0 , 
∂
∂
2
2 0
u
h
i
i
< , 
∂
∂ ∂
∂
∂
2 2
0
u
h c
u
c hc
i
i i
i
i i
= = . 
 
Assumption 13 (war-time capital accumulation): The war effort reduces the i-th group’s 
capital-investment possibilities. In addition, the hostile actions carried by its adversary 
adversely affect the i-th group’s population growth and capital stock. More specifically, 
)())](())(([)()())(()( tkthnththtctkftk ijijiiiiii +−−−=
•
δ   (16) 
where, 
∂δ
∂
i
jh
> 0 ,  
∂ δ
∂
2
2 0
i
jh
< , 
∂
∂
n
h
i
j
< 0 , 
∂
∂
2
2
0
n
h
i
j
< . 
 
In this differential game we assume open-loop strategies. The Hamiltonian 
corresponding to each group i problem of choosing its consumption and hostility 
trajectories can be expressed as: 
)}())](())(([)()())((){())(),(()( tkthnththtctkftthtcuetH ijijiiiiiiiii
t
i
i +−−−+= − δλρ  
)}())](())(([)()())((){( tkthnththtctkft jijijjjjjj +−−−+ δλ   (17) 
and the first-order conditions are 
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))]}(())(([))(('){()(
.
thnthtkftt jijiiiii +−−= δλλ    (18) 
0)())((' =−− ttcue iii
ti λρ      (19) 
0)()()())((' =





+−−− tk
h
n
h
ttthue j
i
j
i
j
jiii
ti
∂
∂
∂
∂δ
λλρ .   (20) 
 
Consistently with assumption 12, let  
ii
iii hcu
γβ +=       (21)  
then the optimal consumption growth rate of each group i in civil war is given by 
i
jijiiii
i
i
W
hnhtkf
tc
tc
c
β
δρ
−
++−
=≡
•
1
))()(())(('
)(
)(ˆ .   (22) 
 
Comparing the civil-war no-arbitrage rule of consumption to the partition no-
arbitrage rule of consumption, it is interesting to note that when the hostile actions taken 
by group j are mainly and effectively directed to inflict casualties upon group i than to 
damage its capital stock, the civil-war rate of growth of the i-th group’s consumption is 
larger than the partition rate of growth of its consumption and, consequently, also exceeds 
its rate of consumption growth in a strictly political federation. That is, $ $ $c c cw F> >  for 
the group (i) on the receiving hand. The underlying rationale is as follows.   
Recalling assumption 13, when the actions of group j are mainly directed to inflict 
casualties and are effective, the capital-labor ratio’s depreciation rate for group i during 
the civil-war (δi j i jh n h( ) ( )+ ) and, consequently, its user-cost of (per capita) capital are 
smaller than those under partition. Moreover, starting from the same initial capital-labor 
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ratio and consumption level, per-capita capital accumulation in civil war by group i is 
smaller than that under partition due to diversion of resources to military activities and 
destruction inflicted by group j’s operations. Recalling that the production function is 
concave, group i’s marginal product of capital in the civil war is larger than that under 
partition. In sum, group i’s marginal-product and user-cost differential in a casualty-
intensive warfare launched by group j is larger than that under partition and, in view of 
equations (4) and (22), facilitating a higher consumption growth rate for group i.4 
The above argument suggests that, when both groups are sufficiently large, each 
group “prefers” (from the perspective of consumption-maximizing-lifetime utility) a 
casualty-intensive (bloody) warfare by its adversary to a capital-damaging (sabotage) 
warfare. In contrast, in a sabotage-intensive warfare both the user costs and marginal 
product of per capita capital for the recipient group are larger than those under partition 
and strictly political federation. If the excess user cost (vis-a-vis partition and federation) 
is larger (smaller) than the excess marginal product of per-capita capital, the rate of 
growth of the recipient group’s consumption during a sabotage-intensive campaign of its 
adversary is smaller (larger) than those under partition and federation. From the 
perspective of lifetime-utility-maximizing consumption, sabotage is, therefore, a more 
effectively harming course of action (in particular, for the smaller and poorer group) than 
bloody warfare.  
Attention should also be paid to the evolution of the level of hostility. In this open-
loop differential game the growth rate of hostility displayed by group i is: 
                                                        
4 This analytically derived result is consistent with the folk saying: “Let us eat and drink; 
for to morrow we shall die”. (Bible, Isaiah 22:13) 
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
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•••
−−
•
][)(')(')1())('')(''()1(
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)( 21
jjjjijijiiiijjijijii
i
i kkhnhcckhnh
th
th
i λλδββλδγγ β
               .(23) 
(See Appendix C.) 
As the sum in the brackets in the first term on the right-hand side of this expression is 
negative, group i’s rate of growth of hostility towards group j increases with the evolution 
of group’s j wealth. That is, group i becomes more aggressive as group j’s capital stock 
grows along time.  
 
V. Conclusion 
When the costs of civil war are affected by human and material wealth disparities 
between the two groups inhabiting the land and when the costs of tolerating coexistence 
rise with the groups’ cultural and spiritual differences and degree of cohesion, the 
equilibrium political state of affair is either partition, federation, or civil war, pending the 
particular combination of the groups’ socioeconomic characteristics. The optimal 
consumption trajectories associated with these possible equilibrium political systems were 
compared. If the members of each group are lifetime-utility maximizers, this comparison 
identifies the conditions that may generate political instability and transition from one 
political state of affair to another. 
Starting from the same initial capital-labor ratio, the optimal consumption growth 
rate for group i in a strictly political federation is lower than its optimal consumption 
growth rate under sole sovereignty in the case of partition if its population growth rate is 
lower than that of group j and if it is wealthier than group j. In contrast, the members of 
 
 19
group i may economically benefit from joining a federation, even when they are wealthier 
and multiply in a lower rate than their counterparts in group j, if the federation facilitates 
technological transfer and if their initial technology is inferior to the hybrid. 
Our analysis suggests that the growth rate of a group’s consumption during a civil 
war is larger than those attainable under partition and a strictly political federation if its 
adversary’s warfare is mainly aimed at inflicting casualties. In a civil war, each group may 
prefer (from the perspective of consumption-maximizing-lifetime utility) a casualty-
intensive warfare by its adversary to sabotage. The rate of growth of the recipient group’s 
consumption during a sabotage-intensive campaign of its adversary is smaller (larger) than 
those under partition and federation if the extra user cost is larger (smaller) than the extra 
marginal product of per capita capital. From the perspective of consumption-maximizing-
lifetime utility, sabotage is a more effective strategy than casualty-inflicting operations. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: The Crossbreed’s lifetime expected utility 
Claim: J t e u d dt e u t t dt
t
t= ∫ ∫ = ∫
∞
− −
∞
φ τ τρτ ρ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 0 0
Φ . 
Proof: Let F t( )  is the cumulative density function associated with the probability of 
dissolution at t  (i.e., the probability of continuation up to t ), then 
 
φ( ) ' ( )t F t=            (A1) 
 
and Eq. (9) can be rendered as  
 
J F t e u d dt v t dU
t
= ∫ ∫






= ∫
∞
−
∞
' ( ) ( ) ( )
0 0 0
ρτ τ τ       (A2) 
where, 
 
v e u d
t
= ∫ − ρτ τ τ
0
( )          (A3) 
and  
 
U F t= − −( ( ))1 .         (A4) 
The integration by parts rule suggests that  
 
J vdU Uv Udv= = − ∫∫
∞∞
00
.        (A5) 
Note, however, that 
 
Uv F t e u d
t
= − − ∫





 =−
∞
( ( )) ( )1 0
0 0
ρτ τ τ       (A6) 
because when evaluated at the lower limit 
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 Uv F e u d= − − ∫





 =−( ( )) ( )1 0 0
0
0
ρτ τ τ       (A7) 
and when evaluated at the upper limit 
Uv F T e u d= − − ∫





 =−
∞
( ( )) ( )1 0
0
ρτ τ τ       (A8) 
as  
lim
t
F
→∞
= 1.          (A9) 
 Hence,  
J Udv= − ∫
∞
0
.          (A10) 
By virtue of equation (A3) 
dv e d= −ρτ τ           (A11)  
and the substitution of equations (A4) and (A11) into (A10) implies  
J e u t t dtt= ∫ −
∞
ρ ( ) ( )
0
Φ          (A12) 
where 
Φ( ) ( ) ( )t u t F t≡ − = −1         (A.13) 
and indicating the probability of the survival of the federation at least until t . QED 
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Appendix B: The Crossbreed’s optimal consumption growth rate 
Following Appendix A and substituting Eq. (10) for ci , the imaginary crossbreed’s 
lifetime utility is 
J e p t u f k t n k t k t k t k t dtt i i i i i i i i
ci t
i
= ∫ − + −∑








−
∞
=
ρ δ
0 1
2
1 2( ) ( ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )) ( ( ), ( ))
.
( )
1 2444444 3444444 Φ . (B1) 
By virtue of Euler equation, 
∂
∂
∂
∂
J
k
d
dt
J
ki i
−








=. 0 , the necessary condition for maximum 
lifetime utility is 
( )e p u c f k n e p u c d
dt
e p u ct i i i i i i i
t
i i i ki
t
i i i
− − −− + + + =ρ ρ ρδ' ( )[ ' ( ) ( )] ( ) '( )Φ Φ Φ 0  (B2) 
which implies 
p u c f k n p u c p u c p u c c p u ci i i i i i i i i i ki i i i i i i i i i i' ( )[ ' ( ) ( )] ( ) ' ( ) "( ) '( )
. . .
− + + + + + + =ρ δ Φ Φ Φ Φ Φ 0
           .(B3) 
Divide both sides of Eq. (B3) by p ui i 'Φ  and solve for ci
.
 to obtain 
c
f k n
u
u
p
p
u c u ci
i i i i
i
i
ki i
i
i i i i
.
.
[ ' ( ) ( )]
'
"( ) / '( )
=
− + + +











 +










−
ρ δ
Φ
Φ
.    (B4) 
Note that by virtue of  Eq. (2) 
u
u
ci
i
i i'
/= β           (B5) 
and 
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− = −
u
u
ci
i
i i i
"
'
( ) /1 β β .        (B6) 
Note further that by virtue of Eq. (5) 
Φ
Φ
ki
i jk k= − −2µ( ) .        (B7) 
By definition 
p
p
d
dt
P
P P
P
P P
i
i
i
i j
i
i j
.
≡
+






+
         (B8) 
and recall Eq. (1) 
p
p
n n pi
i
i j j
.
( )= − .         (B9) 
Eq. (11) is obtained by substituting Eq. (B5) - Eq. (B9) into Eq. (B4) and dividing both 
sides by ci .  
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Appendix C: The optimal rate of change of hostility 
By differentiating  
0)()()())((' =
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
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+−−− tk
h
n
h
ttthue j
i
j
i
j
jiii
ti
∂
∂
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with respect to time: 
2 2
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i i
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ρ ∂δ ∂ρ λ λ
∂ ∂
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   
  
(C2) 
and by rearranging terms, equation (23) is obtained. 
